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A CRITIQUE OF UNITED STATES 
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE THEORY 
Kevin C. Kennedy* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 1980s have been ushered in with a popular mass move-
ment within the Western democracies, demanding an end to the 
nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Coincident with the opening of the United Nations Sec-
ond Special Session on Disarmament on June 12, 1982, the nu-
clear freeze movement reached its zenith by bringing together 
approximately 750,000 persons at the United Nations headquar-
ters to protest the nuclear arms race. l Protests similar to the one 
held in New York have taken place throughout Western Europe 
as well. Not since 'the protests against the war in Vietnam and 
the proposed ABM defense system has the peace movement 
been so proliferate. 
Regardless of one's viewpoint on this issue, it is undeniable 
that the issue of nuclear weapons is with us forever. Since hu-
mankind now possesses the terrible knowledge with which to de-
stroy itself, this question will necessarily confront future genera-
tions even if nuclear weapons are banned. The genie is out of the 
bottle, never to return. Whether the recent mass rallies will 
prove to be merely a passing fad, of course, remains to be seen. 
However, regardless of the future of such popular outpourings, 
the future of nuclear arms will remain one generation's legacy to 
the next. An understanding of the policies which fuel the devel-
opment, deployment and possible use of nuclear weapons is 
therefore essential if we are to remain an involved and educated 
citizenry. This article is an attempt to contribute to that 
understanding. 
As its title suggests, this article is a critical examination of 
nuclear deterrence theory from several standpoints-political, 
moral and legal. It presents the general principles of nuclear de-
terrence theory, criticizes the theory, and suggests new avenues 
of inquiry and focus for nuclear deterrence theorists. 
* A.B. University of Michigan (1973); J.D. Wayne State University Law School 
(1977); LL.M. Harvard Law School (1982). The author is currently law clerk to Judge 
Herbert N. Maletz of the United States Court of International Trade in New York City. 
1. Wall St. J., June 14, 1982, at 1, col. 3. 
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II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE THEORY 
A review of the impressive volume of literature on nuclear 
deterrence theory2 leads one quickly to the conclusion that the 
paramount concern of the nuclear deterrence theorist is the 
credibility of a proposed deterrent. Theorists use two distinct, 
yet related, research approaches to measure credibility: the tech-
nological-military and the psychological-political. The techno-
logical-military dimension of nuclear deterrence theory is con-
cerned with the size of a nation's nuclear arensal, the aresenal's 
deployment modes and the nation's capability of executing a 
successful nuclear attack, even after absorbing a surprise nuclear 
first strike. The psychological-political dimension deals with 
questions of perceptions and political will, such as the commit-
ment to confront an enemy and oppose it at every level of nu-
clear aggression. 
A. The technological-military aspect 
In determining how a country should deploy and then main-
tain a credible nuclear deterrent, theorists and policymakers 
have prescribed minimum military criteria which a nation's nu-
clear arsenal must satisfy. First, a nuclear arsenal must in some 
measure be capable of withstanding an enemy's surprise first 
strike. Thereafter, the arsenal must be capable of being 
launched in a retaliatory second strike.3 Strategic stability is en-
hanced if a country possesses a highly survivable force," for no 
rational enemy, so the argument runs, would launch a nuclear 
first strike in the face of certain retaliation. Thus, the first mili-
tary criterion is pure survivability. -
A second set of criteria-command, control, communica-
tions and intelligence-is known collectively as the control 
mechanisms, and in professional jargon as C3l. Ii The ability to 
2. See, e.g., R. BURNS, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, A BIBLIOGRAPHY 214-19 
(1974). 
3. P. GREEN, DEADLY LOGIC: THE THEORY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 4 (1966) [herein-
after cited as GREEN]; Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror, 37 FOREIGN AFF. 211 
(1959); Ikle, Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?, 51 FOREIGN AFF. 267 (1973) 
[hereinafter cited as Ikle]. 
4. Drell & Wisner, A New Formula for Nuclear Arms Control, 5 INT'L SECURITY, 
Winter 1980-81 at 186. 
5. War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, Boston Globe, Special Section, Oct. 17, 1982, 
at 26; R. ALDRIDGE, THE COUNTERFORCE SYNDROME: A GUIDE TO U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
AND STRATEGIC DoCTRINE 62 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ALDRIDGE]. 
HeinOnline -- 9 Brook. J. Int’l L. 37 1983
1983] NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 37 
have a controlled and well-orchestrated war-fighting capability 
after absorbing a nuclear first strike is considered critical to the 
maintenance of a credible deterrent. Although a single com-
mander of a Poseidon nuclear submarine can launch 160 war-
heads against the cities of the Soviet Union,S many strategists 
nevertheless believe that a credible deterrent exists only when a 
retaliatory second strike can be centrally controlled and di-
rected. The option of selective response must be preserved if 
credibility is to be maintained. For that reason, the control 
mechanisms themselves must be capable of riding out a first 
strike.7 
The third military criterion is that the surviving retaliatory 
force must be capable of retaliating with a certain effect.S The 
exact nature of that effect has been hotly debated in the United 
States. No fewer than five strategic nuclear deterrence concepts 
have been identified: (1) minimum deterrence, (2) massive ur-
ban/industrial retaliation, (3) flexible response, (4) a nuclear-
war-winning capability and (5) denial of a nuclear-war-winning 
capability to the other side.9 
Two common threads run through these five strategic nu-
clear deterrence doctrines. First, deterrence as formulated in 
each of these five concepts is perceived in terms of offensive ca-
pability-"the ability to inflict intolerable damage on the adver-
sary."lO Second, regardless of the nature of the retaliatory policy, 
the same issue is raised: Will the policy be credible in the eyes of 
the enemy? Will it effectively deter the enemy? The more credi-
ble the threat, the more effective the deterrent is thought to 
be.ll 
Minimum deterrence has been identified as "a capacity to 
6. ALDRIDGE, supra note 5, at 69-70; REPORT OF THE SECRETARy-GENERAL OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS 48 (1980) (A. Thunborg, Chairman) [hereinafter 
cited as REpORT OF THE SECRETARy-GENERAL]. 
7. GREEN, supra note 3, at 10. If control mechanisms are destroyed in a first strike, 
the possibility of a massive retaliatory second strike is appreciably increased. See Keeny 
& Panofsky, MAD versus NUTS, 60 FOREIGN MF. 287, 295 (1981-82) [hereinafter cited 
as Keeny & Panofsky]. 
8. GREEN, supra note 3, at 9. 
9. Nitze, Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 207, 
212-13 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Nitze]. 
10. REpORT OF THE SECRETARy-GENERAL, supra note 6, at 110. 
11. R. SYNDER, DETERRENCE, WEAPONS SYSTEMS, AND DECISIONMAKING 35 (1961) 
[hereinafter cited as SNYDER]. See generally D. GOMPERT, M. MANDELBAUM, R. GARWIN & 
J. BARTON, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WORLD POLITICS, ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FuTuRE 
(1977). 
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destroy a few key cities with little if any. . capacity to attack 
a hostile nation's military forces"l2 in the event of a nuclear first 
strike. This level of retaliation is considered to be an adequate 
deterrent by some theorists, who suggest that the loss of even 
one major population center would be considered an unimagin-
able loss by a rational nation and would thereby deter that na-
tion from launching a first strike.13 
The second of the five levels-probably the most frequently 
discussed and debated-is massive urban/industrial retaliation, 
known commonly as mutual assured destruction and dubbed by 
its critics with the acronym MAD. It differs from minimum de-
terrence only in degree: the targeting of cities is the same; MAD 
merely targets more of them.14 The concept calls for the levelling 
of a large part of an enemy's industrial base, the destruction of 
many cities, and the deaths of millions of civilians. III 
Until 1974, the United States' declaratory policy-its public 
pronouncements on strategic nuclear policy-was primarily 
based on the doctrine of .mutual assured destruction.16 Policy 
makers argued that nuclear retaliation had to be a swift, single, 
massive strike involving the loss of a major part of the Soviet 
population and industrial capacity.17 In his first annual fiscal re-
port for 1969, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara summed up 
this policy: 
I would judge that a capability on our part to destroy say, one-
fifth or one-fourth of the [Soviet Union's] population and one-
half of her industrial capacity would serve as an effective de-
terrent. Such a level of destruction would certainly represent 
intolerable punishment to any 20th-century industrial nation.l~ 
A shift in American declaratory policy was announced in 
1973 when the Defense Department adopted the flexible re-
sponse doctrine.19 In that year, declaratory policy shifted from 
12. Nitze, supra note 9, at 212. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. STRATEGIC 
FORCES: DETERRENCE POLICIES AND PROCUREMENT ISSUES (1977) [hereinafter cited as 
CBO REPORT]. 
13. See, e.g., A. MYRDAL, THE GAME OF DISARMAMENT: How THE UNITED STATES AND 
RUSSIA RUN THE ARMS RACE 117 (1976) [hereinafter cited as MVRDAL]. 
14. Nitze, supra note 9, at 213. 
15. [d. 
16. See STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ARMS UNCON-
TROLLED 152 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SIPRI]. 
17. See Ikle, supra note 3, at 268-69. 
18. 1969 DEF. DEP'T ANN. REP. 50. 
19. See SIPRI, supra note 16, at 152. 
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MAD to NUTS: nuclear utilization target selection.20 
This third deterrence option of flexible re-
sponse-sometimes referred to as counterforce strategy-is 
designed to give a country the ability to respond in kind to every 
level of nuclear aggression launched against it. Rather than re-
taliate with a massive second strike against an enemy's civilian 
and urban areas, thereby inviting a similar attack against the 
retaliating country's own civilians and cities, strategists felt it 
necessary to develop a deterrence strategy which would permit a 
"surgical" second strike.21 With the deployment of highly accu-
rate delivery vehicles, it was now technologically feasible to 
launch a surgical strike against select enemy military targets, 
such as missile silos and other hardened targets. It was feared 
that a nation, faced with the decision to retaliate with a massive 
second strike following a limited first strike, might not retaliate 
at all because of the risk of incurring a massive counter-attack 
against its own cities.22 The possibilities of an enemy victory and 
of international extortion were frightening. The capability to re-
taliate in kind rather than massively was thus thought to consti-
tute a deterrent more credible than an exclusively MAD policy. 
On January 10, 1974, Secretary of Defense James Schles-
inger announced that the United States intended to adopt a 
counterforce strategy as a deterrence doctrine.2s The doctrine of 
flexible response implicitly requires that a nation possess the ca-
20. The acronym NUTS was coined to describe targeting decision-making under the 
flexible response doctrine. See Keeny & Panofsky, supra note 7, at 289. 
21. A "surgical" strike refers to an attack in which highly accurate nuclear missiles 
are targeted against selected military bases, thereby mitigating collateral damage to 
nearby cities. Aldridge defines counterforce as "[a] nuclear strategy whereby attack mis-
siles are targeted against the opponent's military emplacements." ALDRIDGE, supra note 
5, at 80. This is to be contrasted to a "countervalue" strategy which targets industrial 
and population centers. For example, if the United States launched a first strike against 
hardened Soviet military targets, such as ICBM missile silos, the Soviet Union could, 
under a flexible response option, respond by launching a counterforce strike against 
United States military targets, sparing densely populated areas. This targeting scheme 
contrasts with an immediate counter-city (some would say "counter-people") retaliatory 
second strike. See Nitze, supra note 9, at 223. 
22. President Nixon queried: "Should the President, in the event of nuclear attack, 
be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians in the 
face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans?" 
ALDRIDGE, supra note 5, at 6. 
23. See SIPRI, supra note 16, at 155. AB further noted in that study, "What Schles-
inger's announcement signaled is not a change in nuclear strategy but the decision by the 
U.S. administration to announce what, up to now, was only tacitly admitted and played 
down in official pronouncements, that is, that the USA has been pursuing a counterforce 
strategy." ld. at 156. 
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pability to fight a nuclear war should deterrence fail to prevent 
its outbreak.24 The flexible response option as enunciated by 
Secretary Schlesinger was designed to make the United States 
deterrent threat a more credible one.211 
In 1977, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announced a 
new objective of American strategic nuclear forces: "An impor-
tant objective of the assured retaliation mission should be to re-
tard significantly the ability of the USSR to recover from a nu-
clear exchange and regain the status of a 20th-century military 
and industrial power more rapidly than the United States."28 Al-
though this policy was not expressly announced as a war-win-
ning capability, the thrust of Secretary Rumsfeld's statement 
was that the United States was to emerge from a nuclear ex-
change victorious in terms of recovery capacity. Nuclear war-
winning capability calls for the deployment of nuclear forces to 
assure a residual nuclear arsenal sufficient to strike again with-
out comparable return damage.27 The pronouncement of Secre-
tary Rumsfeld suggested that the United States acquire a war-
winning capability in this respect. 
The counterforce/flexible response doctrine regained promi-
nence on August 20, 1980, when Secretary of Defense Harold 
Brown spoke at the Naval War College. In his speech, he elabo-
rated on the Carter Administration's reliance on flexible re-
sponse as a key element in United States strategic nuclear pol-
icy.28 Still, the strategic concept of denial-of-a-war-winning 
capability to the other side, the fifth doctrine, was also evident. 
The level of retaliation necessitated under this doctrine envi-
sions that, after a mutual exchange of military-targeted missiles, 
the results are even: this nuclear stalemate thus appears unat-
tractive to any side contemplating a first strike.29 Referring to 
this latest permutation in United States declaratory policy as a 
countervailing strategy, Secretary Brown made the following 
statement: "The essence of the countervailing strategy is to con-
vince the Soviets that they will be successfully opposed at any 
24. ld. at 152. 
25. Nitze, supra note 9, at 223. 
26. 1978 DEF. DEP'T km. REP. 68. 
27. Nitze, supra note 9, at 213. For an alternative view, see Lodal, Assuring Strate-
gic Stability: An Alternative View, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 462 (1976); F. KAPLAN, DUBIOUS 
SPECTER: A SECOND LOOK AT THE "SOVIET THREAT" (1977) [hereinafter cited as KAPLAN]. 
28. Keeny & Panofsky, supra note 7, at 290. 
29. Nitze, supra note 9, at 213. 
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level of aggression they choose, and that no plausible outcome at 
any level of conflict could represent success for them by any rea-
sonable definition of success. "30 Secretary Brown cautioned, 
however, that it was very likely that the first use of nuclear 
weapons at any level would inexorably escalate into full-scale 
nuclear war.31 With the possible exception of minimum deter-
rence, then, all of the foregoing nuclear deterrence doctrines 
have been utilized in United States declaratory policy. 
B. The psychological-political aspect 
The psychological-political dimension of deterrence theory 
is concerned primarily with the question of credibility. The util-
ity of any nuclear deterrence doctrine rests on how it is per-
ceived by the other side. The credibility of any given deterrent is 
dependent on the military means at a country's disposal to im-
plement the declared doctrine.32 
Strategists have identified five factors upon which the credi-
bility of American strategic nuclear policy depends: strategic 
forces must be (1) capable of assured destruction, (2) capable of 
flexible options, (3) equal to those of the Soviet Union, (4) per-
ceived to be equal, and (5) stabilizing.33 
Of these five factors, the fourth is clearly the most impor-
tant in the psychological-political context. It is not the objective 
reality of a given threat which determines its effectiveness, nor is 
it the real flexibility of weaponry which dictates whether or not 
hostilities will erupt.34 Rather, the determining factor is the sub-
jective perception of the credibility of the threat by the other 
side.35 If the subjective psychological requirements of deterrence 
are met, a threat will be credible.36 A subjective impression de-
30. 1982 DEF. DEP'T ANN. REP. 40. 
31. Keeny & Panofsky, supra note 7, at 290. 
32. REPORT OF THE SECRETARy-GENERAL, supra note 6, at 109. For example, in the 
opinion of Defense Secretary Schlesinger, flexible response was an attempt to align 
United States declaratory policy with a credible course of action and thereby improve 
deterrence. See Nitze, supra note 9, at 223. 
33. Schilling, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Concepts in the 1970's: The Search for Suffi-
ciently Equivalent Countervailing Parity, 6 lNT'L SECURITY, FalI1981, at 48, 59 [herein-
after cited as Schilling]. But see KAPLAN, supra note 27, at 32-37, where concepts of 
parity and symmetry are questioned. 
34. See Keeny & Panofsky, supra note 7, at 290. 
35. See Snyder, supra note 11; REPORT OF THE SECRETARy-GENERAL, supra note 6, at 
153. 
36. J. SINGER, DETERRENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 75 (1962) [hereinafter 
cited as SINGER]. 
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pends primarily on perceptions or misperceptions of a country's 
political will, rather than on force deployments.37 
Nuclear deterrence, in the psychological-political context, is 
thus a mechanism for information transfer.38 Communication is 
always assumed to be an integral part of deterrence theory.39 
How are credible threats best communicated? Should 
threats bristle with clarity or should they contain a degree of 
calculated ambiguity? Some theorists argue that ambiguous sig-
nals are dangerous because the nuclear threshold might be inad-
vertently crossed."o However, the barrier against nuclear war is 
highest when the threshold to be crossed in initiating a nuclear 
exchange is sharply defined.41 Since nuclear wars may be trig-
gered by misperceptions of political will,"2 ambiguity in the com-
munication of threats may weaken their credibility."3 
At least three sources of interference that impede the com-
munication of credible threats have been identified: (1) the fail-
ure of the other side to take heed, (2) acts of aggression toward 
the communicator and (3) the warding off of subsequent expo-
sures to a communication."" A failure to communicate can be 
further reinforced by (4) inconsistencies between the words and 
actions of the threatener and (5) the knowledge that the threat-
ener cannot make good its threat."15 Serious threats must be few 
in number if they are to be credible."6 Repetitive, identical com-
munications are to be avoided because such cyclical signals are 
eventually ignored."7 
37. See Greenwood & Nacht, The New Nuclear Debate: Sense or Nonsense?, 52 
FOREIGN AFF. 761, 771 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Greenwood & Nacht]; Keeny & Panof-
sky, supra note 7, at 294-96. 
38. See Schilling, supra note 33, at 59-60. 
39. SNYDER, supra note 11, at 46. According to Snyder, an exception to this assump-
tion can be found in Thomas Schelling'8 THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT. See infra note 64. 
40. REPORT OF THE SECRETARy-GENERAL, supra note 6, at 133. In addition, one writer 
has suggested that increasing uncertainty in the enemy'8 mind may have deleterious ef-
fects on the defenders as well, leading to a loss of confidence among allies. See Freed-
man, NATO Myths, 45 FOREIGN POL'y, Winter 1981-82, at 48,49-50 [hereinafter cited as 
Freedman]. 
41. REPORT OF THE SECRETARy-GENERAL, supra note 6, at 133. 
42. Greenwood & Nacht, supra note 37, at 771. 
43. At the same time, however, some uncertainty about American intentions pre-
vents the Soviet Union from reaching a high subjective probability estimate as to any 
possible United States reponse. See SYNDER, supra note 11, at 17. 
44. Id. at 76. 
45.Id. 
46.Id. 
47. Id. at 75. 
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In sum, the psychological-political dimension of deterrence 
theory requires that declaratory policy be commensurate wit.h 
the military means available to execute the policy. Declaratory 
policy is the expression of a country's political will. Therefore, if 
policy is inconsistent with military means, the will to execute a 
retaliatory second strike may not be perceived as credible. 
III. A CRITIQUE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE THEORY 
Nuclear deterrence theory has enjoyed a pre-eminent posi-
tion in national security debates within the United States during 
the past thirty-seven years. Has nuclear deterrence theory been 
effective? On the one hand, nuclear deterrence could be consid-
ered effective since nuclear weapons have not been employed 
since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, this view can be easily 
countered by arguing that this happy state of affairs is nothing 
more than a" fortuity, in that the risks of nuclear war are essen-
tially independent of any deterrence doctrine. Deductively, of 
course, nuclear deterrence theory cannot be verified. Thus, nu-
clear deterrence strategists can at most claim that their theories 
have neither been entirely discredited nor disproven. However, 
much doubt has been cast on the continued viability of nuclear 
deterrence theory. 
Criticism has been launched against nuclear deterrence the-
ory from at least six fronts. First, critics have charged that nu-
clear deterrence theory is inconsistent, in that it emphasizes 
avoidance of war, while it simultaneously stresses weapons de-
ployment. Second, the assumption made by nuclear deterrence 
strategists that nuclear war is not likely to occur because no ra-
tional government would choose to launch a nuclear first strike 
does not adequately take account of irrational behavior, acciden-
tal and limited nuclear war. Third, nuclear deterrence theory, 
while assuming an air of moral neutrality, is heavily value-laden. 
This is particularly evident in declaratory policies such as 
counterforce which are proffered as "humanitarian" strategic 
nuclear doctrines. Fourth, nuclear deterrence strategists develop 
doctrine ex post facto in order to accommodate and justify the 
latest weapons development which are presented as a fait ac-
compli. Fifth, nuclear deterrence theory is undemocratic and an-
tipopular to the extent it has removed strategic nuclear decision 
making from the national political forum. Finally, nuclear deter-
rence theory fails to take into account the rules of international 
law. The following discussion explores these criticisms. 
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A. Nuclear deterrence theory lacks logical consistency. 
Nuclear deterrence theory is arguably schizophrenic; it si-
multaneously emphasizes offensive capabilities and war-avoid-
ance.48 Nuclear forces must be sufficiently large to discourage an 
enemy from striking; at the same time, a country must prepare 
to fight a war in the event the enemy is not actually 
discouraged.49 
Deterrence theory assumes that military policy is concerned 
only with the prevention of war, not with its outcome.IIO It as-
sumes at the same time, however, that the only military re-
sponse in the event deterrence fails is the automatic execution of 
a retaliatory second strike. 111 The following comment by Ted 
Greenwood and Michael Nacht is paradigmatic of this duality: 
"The United States should. . . maintain a flexible force to deter 
the exercise of Soviet strategic options and to respond appropri-
ately if deterrence fails."112 Deterrence theory is thus to a large 
extent" a double-edged sword. For this reason, it has been 
charged, "it is by no means proved that nuclear deterrence really 
provides the great nuclear powers with security."113 
B. Governments may choose a nuclear war despite the irra-
tionality of such a choice. 
Nuclear deterrence theorists posit that no rational govern-
ment would choose the catastrophe of strategic nuclear war by 
launching a first strike.1I4 This thesis is based on three highly 
questionable assumptions: (1) that governments act rationally, 
(2) that the choice of nuclear war is demonstrably irrational and 
(3) that full-scale nuclear war is unlikely to occur unless it is 
deliberately chosen.1I11 All three assumptions are erroneous. 
48. REPORT OF THE SECRETARy-GENERAL, supra note 6, at 110. Ct. Simes, Deterrence 
and Coercion in Soviet Policy, 5 INT'L SECURITY, Winter 1980-81, at 80, 95. 
49. Id. Defense Undersecretary James Wade testified before the House Defense Ap-
propriations Subcommittee that: "We don't want to fight a nuclear war ••• but we must 
be prepared to do so if such a battle is to be deterred ••.• We must not fear war." 
Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 1, 1982, at 8. 
50. H. BULL, THE CONTROL OF THE ARMS RACE, DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL IN 
THE MISSILE AGE 45 (1961) [hereinafter cited as BULL]. 
51. Id. 
52. Greenwood and Nacht, supra note 37, at 775. 
53. STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, STRATEGIC DISARMAMENT, VERIFI-
CATION, AND NATIONAL SECURITY 61 (1977). 
54. See BULL, supra note 50, at 58. 
55. BULL, supra note 50, at 48. 
HeinOnline -- 9 Brook. J. Int’l L. 45 1983
1983] NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 45 
Governments do not always act rationally, but at times suc-
cumb to dangerously irrational behavior.1I6 The Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbor is frequently cited as one instance when a coun-
try fell victim to irrationality. Irrationality also manifests itself 
in the policy-making process. In the world of nuclear deterrence 
theory, the "bogeyman" view of the diabolical enemy seems to 
dominate policy considerations. The result is ideological hostility 
and intellectual rigidity.1I7 Nations become preoccupied with 
self-protection through military means, and the enhanced na-
tional security of a hostile nation is perceived as diminished se-
curity for one's homeland.lls These tensions may spark danger-
ously irrational acts. A country might also reach short-run and 
long-run decisions which appear consistent and reasonable in 
isolation from each other but which fail to dovetail. For exam-
ple, a policy of research and development expenditures for new 
weapons systems, which promotes short-run national interest, is 
inconsistent with long-run arms control negotiations designed to 
avert a nuclear catastrophe. 
Nuclear war as an alternative to some less drastic course of 
action may not be demonstrably irrational at anyone moment in 
time. It may appear to be the only alternative in the face of 
some intolerable politico-military defeat, such as a deliberate 
Soviet attack utilizing chemical warfare on the island of Oahu, 
Hawaii, or a successful Soviet invasion of the Persian Gulf.1I9 In 
addition, nuclear war could all too easily occur accidentally. A 
technical mistake attributable to human error-for example, the 
false alarm on November 9, 1979, of a Soviet missile at-
tack-could result in a nuclear exchange that neither of the su-
perpowers desires.60 It is unknown whether the Soviet Union has 
had similar false alarms, but surely the United States has not 
56. ld. The exploits of Colonel Qaddafi in the Mediterranean and North Africa con-
stitutes one contemporary example of international behavior with a very tenuous connec-
tion to rationality. Also, modern totalitarian States tolerate dictators who, unchecked by 
other governmental institutions, make many irrational decisions. 
57. GREEN, supra note 3, at 183. 
58. Osgood, Suggestions for Winning the Real War with Communism, 3 J. CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 295 (1959). 
59. One writer has recently observed that "Deterrence and the prevention of war 
..• are not the same thing. Soviet leaders could be powerfully deterred from war, yet 
still conclude in the midst of crisis that war will inevitably occur against their will." 
Steinbruner, Nuclear Decapitation, 45 FOREIGN POL'y, Winter 1981-82, at 16, 27 [herein-
after cited as Steinbruner]. 
60. REPORT OF .THE SECRETARy-GENERAL, supra note 6, at 133. Other false alarms 
were reported by the United States for June 3 and 6, 1980. ld. 
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cornered the market on human error. 
A government might decide to employ tactical nuclear 
weapons in the genuine belief that such a fateful decision would 
not lead to the use of strategic nuclear weapons. However, such 
a belief would probably be nothing more than a vain hope. The 
use of tactical nuclear weapons would inexorably lead to full-
scale nuclear war, in the view of some well-qualified authori-
ties.61 A limited nuclear exchange could all too easily escalate 
into a full-scale encounter as a consequence of miscalculation 
rather than conscious planning.62 
Hedley Bull aptly summarized why governments behave 
irrationally: 
The decisions of governments on matters of peace and war. . . 
do not always reflect a careful weighing of long-range consider-
ations, or a mastery of the course of events.... 
[G]overnments appear to [the historian] ... too preoccupied 
with surviving from day to day even to perceive the direction 
in which they are heading, let alone steer away from it.63 
To engage in the assumption that governments behave rationally 
in the context of nuclear war is extremely dangerous. How did 
this assumption insinuate itself into nuclear deterrence analysis? 
One source is undoubtedly deterrence theorists who utilize game 
theory. 
Game theorists begin their deterrence analysis using the ra-
tional actor model of behavior. This model of human behavior 
assumes not just intelligent behavior, but also "certain kinds of 
consistency in the behavior of ... hypothetical partici-
pants .... "64 However, critics charge that game theory is artifi-
cial because it is a static representation of human behavior. Con-
sequently, values cannot be qualified dynamically, as the 
interplay of strategy, policy and tactics demands.611 Another de-
61. It has been observed: "[A]ny actual use of such weapons is extremely unlikely to 
remain limited." Keeny & Panofsky, supra note 7, at 298. 
62. See Maynes, Old Errors in the New Cold War, 46 FOREIGN POL'y, Spring 1982, 
at 86,100. 
63. BULL, supra note 50, at 49. Governments exist in a world of crises. They often 
find themselves attempting to resolve one crisis after another. The danger of a pre·emp-
tive first strike is greatest in such a crisis situation because the calculus seems to be: 
'Launching a pre-emptive first strike is preferable to the certainty of being the target of 
the first strike ourselves.' ld. at 165. 
64. T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 4 (1963) [hereinafter cited as 
SCHELLING]. 
65. GREEN, supra note 3, at 109. One critic has charged: "High sounding instittes 
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feet of game theory is its bias toward a Hobbesian world of im-
aginary insecurity. This feature of game theory produces mis-
perceptions of missile gaps, bomber gaps, and windows of 
vulnerability.66 
C. Nuclear deterrence theory is not morally neutral. 
Nuclear deterrence analysts, particularly the game theorists, 
assume an air of moral neutrality when discussing deterrence is-
sues. Deterrence theory, as they postulate it, presumes that no 
conduct is absolutely prohibited. However, deterrence rational-
ity is not morally neutral because it calls for maximizing one's 
own interests even if they cause injury to one's opponent.67 Per-
sonal safety is more highly valued than cooperation.6s This is 
clearly an ethical choice. 
Apparelltly unable to avoid making this ethical choice, de-
terrence theorists go further by making an arguably evil one. 
Most moral codes forbid treating human life as a mere policy 
decision. However, deterrence theorists do precisely that, in view 
of their concept of exchange of hostages.69 The exchange of hos-
tages concept was employed in ancient times to preserve peace 
between warring kingdoms. In its contemporary manifestation, 
each of the superpowers holds hostage the civilian populations 
of the other with its respective nuclear arsenal. This arrange-
• • • playa never ending game of chess with real pieces against a real opponent, only they 
never take any pieces nor call a check. They. • • base their moves on untutored intuition 
and speculation concerning political responses to extreme and unlikely contingencies." 
Freedman, supra note 40, at 58. Perhaps the leading game theorist in this field is 
Thomas Schelling. See SCHELLING, supra note 64. See also GREEN, supra note 3, at 109. 
66. See GREEN, supra note 3, at 109. That the so-called "window of vulnerability" 
may indeed be a misperception is to a certain extent underscored by the difficulty which 
the Reagan administration has had in finding an acceptable deployment mode for the 
MX missile, a weapon system designed to help close the "window." Although the Reagan 
administration still maintains that such a window exists, its shifting position on the MX 
basing reflects the fact that certain powerful circles-particularly Congress-<io not 
share the administration's conviction that a window of vulnerability exists. 
67. GREEN, supra note 3, at 213. The use of euphemisms, such as "countervalue" 
instead of "counter-people," is some evidence that deterrence theorists are disguising 
certain moral choices. "Countervalue" involves the targeting of high value, non-military 
targets, such as populated urban and industrial centers. A "counterforce" strategy, by 
comparison, involves the targeting of primarily military targets, such as ICBM silos, mili-
tary airfields and ports, and other military installations of high strategic value. 
68. [d. at 215. 
69. See SCHELLING, supra note 64, at 135-37; Panofsky, The Mutual Hostage Rela-
tionship Between America and Russia, 52 FOREIGN AFF. 109 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 
Panofsky). 
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ment is intended to prevent a nuclear exchange. Should nuclear 
war erupt, however, deterrence theory first accepts and then 
condones the indiscriminate killing of innocent persons.70 
Deterrence theorists have attempted to blunt criticism of 
this seemingly dehumanizing analysis by developing purportedly 
more humanitarian strategies, such as the counterforce and flex-
ible response doctrines. But the counterforce doctrine, an argua-
bly more moral and humanitarian concept because it calls for 
the destruction of military targets in a surgical strike and avoid-
ing untoward effects on nearby civilian populations, presupposes 
that the United States can prevail in a counterforce war. If it 
cannot, or if the Soviet Union refuses to accept the outcome gra-
ciously, a countervalue nuclear strike remains in reserve to con-
vince the recalcitrant nation.'71 
The counterforce doctrine further assumes that a nuclear 
attack can be genuinely surgical-that it can have sufficiently 
minimal collateral effects upon surrounding civilian populations, 
so that the nation absorbing this first surgical strike will not 
deem it necessary to retaliate against the civilian population of 
the enemy in a massive second strike. The reality of modern ·nu-
clear weaponry demonstrates that no nuclear strike can be truly 
surgical in the sense outlined above. If a nuclear attack is 
targeted proximate to an urban area, it will surely have substan-
tial collateral effects on civilians.72 Further, two million civilian 
fatalities-the minimum collateral effect of a surgical 
strike73-could never be stoically accepted. Thus, the closer one 
moves to adopting a counterforce strategy, the more likely one is 
to approach nuclear war. As Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 
observed, "any actual use of [nuclear] weapons is extremely un-
likely to remain limited."?4 Because official United States declar-
atory policy states that a counterforce strategy can keep a nu-
clear war limited, the adoption of a counterforce strategy notifies 
an opponent that a first strike is a definite possibility under ap-
70. GREEN, supra note 3, at 225. See also Ikle, supra note 3, at 279. 
71. GREEN, supra note 3, at 234. 
72. SIPRI, supra note 16, at 159. But see Utgoff, In Defense of Counterforce, 6 
INT'L SECURITY, Spring 1982, at 44. 
73. Even though Minuteman ICBM sites are located in geographically remote areas, 
the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment has estimated that such a "surgical" 
strike would result in two to twenty million fatalities. See Keeny & Panofsky, supra note 
7, at 295. 
74. Id. at 298. 
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propriate circumstances.75 Counterforce strategy blurs any dis-
tinction between tactical and strategic nuclear strikes, so that 
any tactical nuclear "firebreak" that may exist consequently 
disappears.76 
The argument in support of the counterforce/flexible re-
sponse option may be characterized as follows: a surgical strike 
will prevent the warring parties from moving up the ladder of 
nuclear escalation, so why not use tactical and strategic nuclear 
weapons in certain circumstances when our national interests 
will be well served? What this doctrine fails to take into account 
is the fact that effective protection of civilians is not possible 
even under a limited nuclear exchange.77 The United States is 
faced with an inherently MAD world in which a flexible re-
sponse/counterforce strategy has no place. 
D. Nuclear. deterrence doctrine is formulated ex post facto in 
order to rationalize new weapons systems. 
Critics also charge that technological developments dictate 
doctrine.78 The Stockholm International Peace Research Insti-
tute (SIPRI) has observed: 
[N]ew strategic postures have been promulgated in support of 
the procurement and deployment of a new weapon system 
under development or already developed. This is almost una-
voidable since strategic weapon systems take many years to de-
velop; therefore, to evolve a strategic posture first, and then to 
begin development of the weapon it requires, is all but impossi-
ble. Consequently, strategies evolve based on the weapons that 
are under development at anyone time.79 
75. SIPRI, supra note 16, at 159. As Panofsky and Keeny have also observed, the 
only meaningful "firebreak" in modern warfare is between conventional and nuclear 
weapons, not between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. See Keeny & Panofsky, 
supra note 7, at 298. 
76. SINGER, supra note 36, at 86; Panofsky, supra note 69, at 110-11. (the mutual 
hostage relationship is a matter of physical fact, not strategic policy, given the destruc-
tive quality inherent in nuclear weapons); MYRDAL, supra note 13, at 130. 
77. See Keeny & Panofsky, supra note 7, at 298. The current administration still 
believes that civil defense is viable. See The Economist, Feb. 13, 1982, at 24; Christian 
Science Monitor, Feb. 17, 1982, at 9. 
78. See SIPRI, supra note 16, at 157; Doty, Carnesale & Nacht, The Race to Con-
trol Nuclear Arms, in NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY: POINTS OF VIEW 465 
(R. Pranger and R. Labrie, eds. 1977); REPORT OF THE SECRETARy-GENERAL, supra note 6, 
at 115. It has also been suggested that the risks of nuclear war are independent both of 
doctrine and its application. See Keeny & Panofs~, supra note 7, at 287. 
79. SIPRI, supra note 16, at 157. 
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Doctrines are promulgated ex post facto to provide a rationale 
for the fait accompli-the latest technological developments and 
new weapons systems.80 
A similar relationship exists between the psychological-po-
litical and technological-military dimensions of deterrence the-
ory. Although the latter is supposed to be shaped by the tenets 
of the former, the military side of deterrence theory has taken 
on its own vitality. Some deterrence theorists posit, for example, 
that more missile launchers are needed if the United States is to 
safeguard the "balance of terror."81 What these theorists refuse 
to concede is that military capabilities do not need to be "equal" 
or "balanced" once the level sufficient to make good a threat of 
terror and devastation has been surpassed.82 Deterrence does not 
require parity in offensive forces in order to be effective. All that 
is needed is a sufficient threat of unacceptable damage. 
This last point highlights the critical importance of the psy-
chological-political dimension of deterrence theory. Concern 
with strategic "inequality" has focused attention on the static 
numerical differences between the United States and the Soviet 
Union with respect to the number of launchers in their arsenals, 
the throw weight of those launchers, and the number of reentry 
vehicles each launcher has in its payload.83 The proper focus 
ought to be on war-fighting capabilities and war-outcomes-the 
dynamic features of a strategic nuclear force-rather than on 
cold tally sheets that indicate the number of MIRVed missiles, 
nuclear submarines and strategic bombers each nation 
possesses.84 
Even when the focus is appropriately on force performance, 
80. See, e.g., T. GREENWOOD, MAKING THE MIRV, A STUDY OF DEFENSE DECISION 
MAKING (1975). 
81. See MYRDAL, supra note 13, at 118. 
82. MYRDAL, supra note 13, at 118. 
83. As used herein, "launcher" refers to an intercontinental ballistic missile, either 
land or submarine launched. "Throw weight" and "payload" are used synonymously and 
have been defined as "[t)he weight of a missile remaining after the last booster rocket 
has separated." ALDRIDGE, supra note 5, at 85. The greater the throw weight of a missile, 
the more warheads it can deliver. A "reentry vehicle," in the case of ballistic missiles, is 
the device which encases the nuclear bomb, often referred to as the warhead. MYRDAL, 
supra note 13, at 86. 
84. Schilling, supra note 33, at 66-68. This point is stressed in Stein bruner, supra 
note 59, at 17-18, where the author notes that the survivability of command, control, 
communications and intelligence is a critical element. Compare Keeny & Panofsky, 
supra note 7, where those authors question the idea that control mechanisms can be 
adequately protected from a nuclear first strike. The authors note that C3I components 
remain inherently fragile and easily damaged despite efforts to harden them. 
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how much post-first strike nuclear capacity is sufficient for de-
terrence? Some deterrence theorists answer in strictly quantita-
tive terms.86 Again, critics charge that the calculus must be more 
psychological-political than military.88 The crux of deterrence is 
an assured response of uncertain dimensions, which necessarily 
involves a qualitative guess as to the intentions of an enemy.87 
E. Nuclear deterrence theory has an antidemocratic bias. 
Critics further submit that deterrence theory is undemo-
cratic and essentially antipopular. The antipopular bias is mani-
fested particularly in theory formulation. One critic has summa-
rized the deterrence theorists' position as follows: "To the extent 
that the political process affects political decision-making with a 
serious element of 'irrationality,' national security policy-making 
must be depoliticized if it is to be 'rational.' "88 
Historically, Congress has been deferential to the Executive 
on deterrence issues.89 Nuclear deterrence policy formulation 
has been largely removed from the political arena, thereby ex-
cluding the American public from effective participation.90 The 
85. See, e.g., Nitze, supra note 9, at 214. 
86. See MYRDAL, supra note 13, at 116-17. In the view of McGeorge Bundy, adviser 
to President Kennedy, one bomb on one city would be a "catastrophic blunder," ten 
bombs on ten cities would be a "disaster beyond history," and one hundred bombs on 
one hundred cities would be "unthinkable." Bundy's statement was supported by Her-
bert York, former Science Adviser to President Eisenhower, who added that "from one 
to ten are enough whenever the course of events is being rationally determined." Id. at 
117. Nevertheless, this notion of minimum deterrence is difficult to define because one 
cannot know with any certainty exactly what constitutes an intolerable reprisal. See RE-
PORT OF THE SECRETARy-GENERAL, supra note 6, at 111. As Myrdal notes, "Of course, 
there can be no calculus for lunatic decisions." MYRDAL, supra note 13, at 117. 
87. H. CLEVELAND, NATO: THE TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN 44-45 (1970) [hereinafter 
cited as CLEVELAND]. A difference of opinion exists as to when induced uncertainty in an 
opponent's calculation is desirable. See SNYDER, supra note 11, at 36. Still, deterrence, 
not surprisingly, is the declared purpose of United States strategic forces. It remains 
unclear why the United States is not more explicit about its plans and capabilities for 
producing destruction within the Soviet Union. See Schilling, supra note 33, at 60. 
88. GREEN, supra note 3, at 248. 
89. See, e.g., AsPIN, The Power of Procedure, in CONGRESS AND ARMS CONTROL 43 
(Platt & Weiler eds. 1978). See also Laurance, The Changing Role of Congress in De-
fense Policy-Making, 30 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 213 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
Laurance]. 
90. See Mandelbaum, The Bomb, Dread, and Eternity, 5 INT'L SECURITY No., Fall 
1980 at 3; Johansen, SALT Was Never Intended to Disarm, in ARMS CONTROL 156, 157 
(W.P. Lineberry ed. 1979). It is not yet clear what impact the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U.S. 139 (1981), 
will have on public participation in the deterrence debate. The Court there held that 
there is a national security exception to the requirements of section 102(2)(C) of the 
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political base for national security policy making, now rather 
narrow and restricted, should be expanded and broadened. Con-
gress should take a more active part in this area in order to in-
crease public debate on issues involving deterrence.91 
The constitutional delegation of authority to Congress in 
the field of foreign affairs92 provides a powerful argument that 
Congress ought to assume a more prominent role in nuclear de-
terrence policy formulation. After reviewing the various consti-
tutionally mandated bases of congressional responsibility, Pro-
fessor Louis Henkin concluded: 
To the Constitutional Fathers, one might guess, the most im-
portant power in foreign relations was the power to declare 
war, and that was given to Congress .... The power to declare 
and wage war implies power to prepare for war and to act to 
deter and prevent war: hence, elaborate "peacetime" defense 
programs entailing not only huge expenditures but detailed 
regulatory programs, . . .93 
Henkin further argued quite forcefully that the power to declare 
war "surely includes the power to decide not to go to war, as by 
a proclamation of neutrality; it must include also the power to 
determine national policy generally, for these might determine 
war or peace."94 This last point has obvious bearing on the role 
of Congress in nuclear deterrence policy formulation. 
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976), thereby allowing the 
Department of the Navy to keep secret whether nuclear weapons are being stored in 
Honolulu. This decision may cut off public debate in one important area of general pub· 
lic concern-the environmental impact of nuclear weapons facilities. 
91. See Laurance, supra note 89; Pringle, Nuclear Unsa/eguards, The New Repub· 
lic, Dec. 23, 1981, at 11. 
92. Article I, section 8 of the Constitution confers upon Congress powers related 
directly to foreign affairs. These enumerated powers are: "To regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;" U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 3; "To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Sens, 
and Offences against the Law of Nations;" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; "To declare 
War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on 
Land and Water." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. Congress also hns the general power to 
tax and spend for the common defense and the general welfare. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 1. The treaty ratification power of the Senate under article II, section 2 of the Consti· 
tution is also of great importance, as is most recently evidenced by the SALT II debacle. 
For an excellent work on the constitutional distribution of political power in the foreign 
affairs area, see L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 29·123 (1972) [here· 
inafter cited as HENKIN). 
93. HENKIN, supra note 92, at 71. 
94. ld. at 83. See also Bickel, Congress, the President, and the Power to Wage War, 
48 CHI.[·)KENT L. REV. 131 (1971). 
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Over the past few years, a number of congresspersons have 
instituted legal actions against the Executive Branch, challeng-
ing Executive encroachment on the constitutional prerogatives 
of the legislature.911 Arguably, an interested congressperson could 
bring an action seeking a declaration that the President's policy 
of a possible first use of nuclear weapons without the prior con-
sultation of Congress is an unconstitutional derogation of Con-
gress' war-making powers. 
While congressional-plaintiff lawsuits provide interesting 
reading in the morning newspaper, congressional recourse to the 
courts should be viewed as a last resort. Congressional control 
over federal appropriations is a more attractive and powerful ve-
hicle for shaping nuclear deterrence policy than is litigation. 
Given the penchant of the judiciary to utilize the political ques-
tion doctrine to avoid accepting jurisdiction in cases involving 
national defense policy,96 it is unlikely that legal challenges by 
Congress in this area will succeed. Regrettably, in a world of plu-
ralistic politics, the courts appear to be the only available alter-
native, however futile, for congresspersons whose legislative ef-
forts have been thwarted. 
F. Nuclear deterrence theory ignores relevant rules of inter-
national law. 
A final criticism of nuclear deterrence theory is that it to-
tally fails to account for or incorporate the rules of international 
law into its premises and postulates.97 Of particular relevance 
are the laws of war, the prohibition against the use of force and 
95. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 
F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See Note, Unilateral Presidential Treaty Termination Power 
by Default: An Analysis of Goldwater v. Carter, 15 TEx. INT'L L.J. 317 (1980). See gen-
erally McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REV. 241 (1981); 
Note, The Justiciability of Congressional-Plaintiff Suits, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 526 (1982); 
Note, Congressional Access to the Federal Courts, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1632 (1977); Note, 
Congressional Standing to Challenge Executive Action, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1366 (1974). 
96. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1316, 1321 (1973); Massachu-
setts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Da Costa v. Laird, 448 F.2d 
1368 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 979 (1972); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 
(E.D. Pa. 1972). 
97. Although the broader question of the legality of nuclear weapons under interna-
tionallaw is beyond the scope of this article, serious doubts in this connection are raised 
by the use of nuclear weapons as contemplated within the framework of nuclear deter-
rence theory. 
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the right of self-defense enunciated in the United Nations Char-
ter. The discussion will address these issues seriatim.98 
1. The Laws of War 
"Laws of war are the rules of the Law of Nations respecting 
warfare."99 Customary internationallawloo recognizes three prin-
ciples underlying all other rules of warfare: the principles of mil-
itary necessity, humanity and chivalry.lol Together they form 
general guidelines for the conduct of hostilities. 
The principle of military necessity states that, subject to the 
principles of humanity and chivalry, a belligerent nation may 
employ any amount or kind of force in order to realize the com-
plete conquest of the enemy with the least possible loss of time, 
life and money.102 The principle of humanity prohibits the use of 
force in excess of that necessary for the conduct of hostilities. loa 
Lastly, the concept of chivalry forbids resort to "dishonorable 
means, expedients, or conduct.m04 General devastation or a 
"scorched earth" policy is absolutely prohibited insofar as it 
98. One additional area of international law ignored by nuclear deterrence theorists 
is the body of law respecting the amicable, non-compulsive settlement of state differ-
ences by negotiation, consultation, good offices, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and 
judicial settlement. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 1-251 (7th ed. H. Lau-
terpacht 1952) [hereinafter cited as 2 L. OPPENHEIM]; 12 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 894-1152 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 12 M. WHITEMAN]. Of course, nuclear 
deterrence, as the threat of force to induce or prevent certain conduct, is by definition at 
odds with the pacific settlement of disputes. 
99. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 98, at § 67. 
100. Customary international law is "state practices accepted as legally binding by 
the subjects of international law." G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, A MANUAL OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 558 (1976). Lauterpacht defines customary international law a8 "a 
clear and continuous habit of doing certain actions. • • under the aegis of the conviction 
that these actions are, according to International Law, obligatory or right." 1 L. OPPEN-
HEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 17 (7th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1952). In addition, international 
custom is defined as a primary source of international law under article 38(1)(b) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 45 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945). 
101. These three principles, particularly that of humanity, find their source in 
"principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civi-
lized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience." Geneva 
Convention of 1949 for the Amelioration ofthe Condition of the Sick and Wounded, art. 
63, para. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3115, 3152, T.I.A.S. No. 3362; 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 98, at 
§ 116a(c). For a discussion of the origins of the laws of war, see 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra 
note 98, at §§ 67-68. 
102. 10 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 299-30 (1968) [hereinafter 
cited as 10 M. WHITEMAN]. For another definition of military necessity, see Downey, The 
Law of War and Military Necessity, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 251, 254 (1953). 
103. 10 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 102, at 299-300. 
104. [d. at 299. 
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constitutes an attempt to cause permanent damage to 
territory. lOIS 
Against this background of customary international law, 
specific conventions have been concluded which regulate the 
conduct of international hostilities. The most significant devel-
opments in the laws of war relevant to nuclear deterrence theory 
have occurred as a result of the ratification of these conventions. 
Although there are several important treaties and conventions 
bearing on the subject of nuclear deterrence,106 two of the more 
significant conventions, the Hague Conventions of 1907107 and 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949,108 will be considered. 
The preamble to Hague Convention Number IV of the 1907 
provides in pertinent part: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, 
the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, 
in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the 
inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection 
and the rule of the principles of the law of Nations, as they 
result from usages established among civilized peoples, from 
the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public 
conscience.109 
As a corollary to this general statement of principles, article 22 
of the Annex to this Convention states that "the right of bel-
ligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlim-
ited. "110 In addition, article 23 expressly bans the use of poison 
or poisoned weapons;lll article 23(e) prohibits the use of "arms, 
projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffer-
ing."ll2 Article 25 further provides that "the attack or bombard-
105. Id. at 389. 
106. See, e.g., Hague Convention No. II of 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403; Hague 
Convention No. III of 1899, 32 Stat. 1827, T.S. No. 396; Hague Convention No. IV of 
1899, 32 Stat. 1839, T.S. No. 393; Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Sys-
tems, May 26, 1972, United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3437, T.I.A.S. No. 7503; Interim 
Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms, May 26, 1972, United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3463, T.I.A.S. No. 7504. 
107. See, e.g., Hague Convention No. III of 1907, 36 Stat. 2259, T.S. No. 538; Hague 
Convention No. IV of 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539. 
108. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3115, T.I.A.S. No. 3362; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3517, T.I.A.S. No. 3365. 
109. Hague Convention No. IV of 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2279-80, T.S. No. 539. 
110. Id. at 2301, T.S. No. 539. 
l11.Id. 
112. Id. at 2302, T.S. No. 539. 
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ment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or build-
ings which are undefended is prohibited. "113 
Article I of Hague Convention No. III, which addresses the 
issue of the commencement of hostilities, provides that hostili-
ties "must not commence without previous and explicit warning, 
in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ulti-
matum with conditional declaration of war."U4 The systematic 
violation and wholesale disregard of the Hague Conventions dur-
ing World War 1,111> followed by the surprise invasions by Ger-
many and the atrocities committed against civilians during 
World War II, made it painfully clear to most nations that the 
laws of war needed to be reevaluated. The Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 were adopted in response to the perceived shortcomings 
of the then extant laws of war. 
The overall theme of the Geneva Conventions is to provide 
for the humane treatment of civilians and injured combatants.u6 
These agreements also signal the first attempt to afford treaty 
protection to non-combatants. For example, article 13 of the Ge-
neva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War notes that the Convention is intended to "allevi-
ate the sufferings caused by war;" article 16 requires that the 
wounded and sick "shall be the object of particular protection 
and respect;" and article 147 of that Convention defines "grave 
breaches" as the "willful killing, torture or inhumane treatment" 
of civilians, "willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to 
body or health, . . . or extensive destruction . . . of property, 
not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully 
and wantonly."U'1 Article 53 of this Convention similarly prohib-
its the destruction of property belonging to civilians. us Hospi-
113. [d. 
114. Hague Convention No. III of 1907, 36 Stat. 2259, 2271, T.S. No. 538. 
115. Aerial bombardment of civilians and seizure of private property were frequent. 
2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 98, at §§ 143a, 214a. Other shortcomings of the Hague Con-
ventions in the aftermath of World War I are discussed in 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 
98, at § 69a. 
116. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3115, T.I.A.S. 
No. 3362. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
1949,6 U.S.T. 3317, T.I.A.S. No. 3364. 
117. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3517, 3528, 3618, T.I.A.S. No. 3365. The customary rules of 
war also distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. See G. SCHWARZENBERGER 
& E. BROWN, supra note 100. 
118. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
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tals are also protected from intentional attack under articles 18 
and 19.119 
While not intended to be an exhaustive exposition on the 
laws of war, the foregoing discussion has attempted to demon-
strate that a primary purpose of promulgating rules of war is to 
delineate the permissible forms of physical pressure which bel-
ligerents may use against one another. In this application, the 
rules of war represent a dynamic tension between the push of 
military necessity and the pull toward preservation of civiliza-
tion.120 As one commentator has observed, the laws of war are 
the only legal restraints which stand between civilization and 
the most barbarous forms of war.121 For this reason alone they 
should be scrupulously observed and zealously enforced by the 
world community.122 
Against this background we turn to a discussion of these 
rules of war and their relevance to nuclear deterrence theory. 
First, the contamination resulting from the use of nuclear weap-
ons, not to mention the inevitable collateral effects on non-com-
batants resulting from the use of even the least powerful nuclear 
weapon,123 leaves little room for the view that the use of nuclear 
weapons as contemplated in nuclear deterrence theory comports 
with the rules of war. This is true even if such weapons were to 
be directed solely against military targets, as envisioned in lim-
ited nuclear war scenarios.124 More important, however, nuclear 
deterrence theorists are not so much concerned with limiting the 
collateral effects of nuclear weapons as they are with limiting the 
War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3517, 3552, T.I.A.S. No. 3365. 
119. ld. at 3530, T.I.A.S. No. 3365. 
120. G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, supra note 100, at 160. 
121. ld. at 162. 
122. In addition, given the notorious absence of enforceable legal sanctions in the 
event of a breach of these principles, national self-interest strongly militates in favor of 
slavish adherence to them. 
An effective yet non-compulsory sanction has emerged in the nuclear arms control 
area where withdrawal from a treaty can be threatened to ensure treaty compliance. See, 
e.g., Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United 
States-U.S.S.R., art. XV, para. 2, 23 U.S.T. 3435, 3446, T.I.A.S. No. 7503. 
123. See A. KATZ, LIFE AFTER NUCLEAR WAR (1982); Keeny & Panofsky, supra note 
7, at 294. 
124. It may be argued, however, that the use of nuclear weapons cannot be regarded 
as violative of international law in the absence of any customary rule or international 
convention banning their use. See 10 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 102, at 454. For a brief 
discussion of the legality of nuclear weapons under international law, see G. 
SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LEGALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 47-49 (1958). 
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attack itself, a dubious proposition indeed.125 
Nuclear deterrence concepts such as mutual assured de-
struction necessarily envisage killing millions of non-combat-
ants, destroying private property, churches, hospitals and cul-
tural centers, and ultimately causing general devastation. The 
effects of nuclear weapons would be simply too indiscriminate 
not to cause the deaths of innumerable civilians as well as gen-
eral devastation.126 The United States policy shift from mutual 
assured destruction to flexible response can be viewed as an at-
tempt to reverse the public antipathy for a strategic nuclear pol-
icy, which called for the annihilation of an entire nation. 
Lastly, deterrence concepts such as launch on warning127 
preclude an unequivocal warning, declaration of war or ultima-
tum as required by the Hague Convention Number III prior to 
commencement of hostilities.126 An attack plan of preemptive 
first strike is defective for the same reason. In conclusion, a 
strong argument can be made that the laws of war, while gener-
ally ignored by nuclear deterrence theorists, are nonetheless rel-
evant in the context of nuclear deterrence theory. 
What of the use of nuclear weapons in self-defense or repri-
sal? One could argue that nuclear deterrence strategists threaten 
only the first use of nuclear weapons, but that the actual use of 
nuclear weapons would be reserved exclusively for a retaliatory 
second strike in self-defense or reprisal. Whether and to what 
extent this is permitted under international law calls for an ex-
amination of the use of force and self-defense under the United 
Nations Charter. 
2. The United Nations Charter 
Before considering the principles of self-defense under the 
United Nations Charter, a brief description of customary inter-
nationallaw129 predating the Charter will provide some enlight-
ening background. The position of customary international law 
concerning the use of force in self-defense may be summarized 
as follows: the need for self-defense must be compelling and in-
125. See supra text accompanying notes 71-77. 
126. See A. KATZ, supra note 123, passim; Keeny & Panofsky, supra note 7, at 295. 
127. "Launch on warning" refers to a pre·emptive, hair-trigger nuclear attack plan 
under which strategic nuclear weapons would be launched immediately after the discov-
ery of an imminent attack by one's nuclear opponent. 
128. See supra text accompanying note 114. 
129. See supra note 100. 
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stant, and the measures of self-defense may comprise any action 
necessary to repel any imminent or present invasion.130 Custom-
ary international law thus permits the use of force in anticipa-
tory self-defense. 
Closely related to self-defense is the concept of reprisal, also 
recognized under customary internationallaw.l3l The difference 
between the two principles is that while resort may be had to 
self-defense in order to eliminate an immediate threat, reprisals 
are designed to redress unlawful acts long since committed by an 
enemy.132 Atrocities were not permitted, however, as an act or 
reprisal.133 Reprisals are thus acts in retaliation against a pre-
ceding illegal act. 
The shift to a legal regime within which the permissible use 
of force was substantially circumscribed134 was a revolutionary 
one, heralded by the adoption of the United Nations Charter. 
Under articles 2(4)135 and 5p36 of the Charter, forcible reprisals 
are illegal.137 Any other threat or use of force except in self-de-
fense against an armed attack is likewise prohibited. Many com-
mentators therefore believe that, unlike the situation under cus-
tomary international law, a defending country must be under 
armed attack before resorting to self-defense.138 
130. G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, supra note 100, at 150. 
131. Reprisals in time of war, according to Lauterpacht, "occur when one belligerent 
retaliates upon another, by means of otherwise illegitimate acts of warfare, in order to 
compel him. . . to abandon illegitimate acts of warfare and to comply in future with the 
rules of legitimate warfare." 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 98, at § 247 (citation omitted). 
132. 10 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 102, at 312; 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 98, at 
§§ 33-37. 
133. 10 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 102, at 339. 
134. For a further description of this shift, see 12 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 5-6 (1971); 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 98, at §§ 52fe-521. 
135. "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 
para. 4. 
136. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Na-
tions, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security .•.• " U.N. CHARTER art. 51. For a further discussion of the 
subjects of collective security and the role of the Security Council under Chapter VII of 
the U.N. Charter in resolving international conflicts, see 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 98, 
at §§ 25b-25ge. 
137. G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, supra note 100, at 151; 12 M. WHITEMAN, 
supra note 134, at 7. 
138. See Badr, The Exculpatory Effect of Self-Defense in State Responsibility, 10 
GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 1, 7 (1980). Compare 5 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 985-90 (1971); 12 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 134, at 8-10. 
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The use of force in self-defense under the United Nations 
Charter must also be proportionate.139 In this connection, com-
mentators have noted that, discounting the question of the legal-
ity of nuclear weapons per se, the use of nuclear weapons in any 
situation must be intended to retaliate in kind against a prior 
nuclear attack.140 
Not only does the United Nations Chart~r prohibit the use 
of force, but it also directs member states who are parties to any 
dispute which endangers peace to "first of all, seek a solution by 
negotiation, enquiry .... "141 Members are further directed to 
"settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a 
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are 
not endangered,m42 such as by negotiation, mediation or judicial 
settlement/4a or by recourse to the United Nations Security 
Council.144 
What about anticipatory self-defense? The principle of pre-
sent danger would permit preventive action in order to eliminate 
an imminent threat or danger of attack.14G However, a restrictive 
reading of article 51 of the Charter counsels that intervention 
under the present danger principle is beyond the ambit of article 
51. Any other interpretation invites countries to interpret 
"armed attack" as including the threat of attack, thereby weak-
ening the system of collective security conceived of under the 
United Nations.H6 Wary of giving a nation wide latitude in in-
terpreting for itself precisely what an "armed attack" is, several 
commentators have expressed the view that article 51 does not 
permit anticipatory self-defense.147 One author has written that 
139. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 
597-98 (1963). See also 12 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 134, at 46. 
140. See 10 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 102, at 492-93. 
141. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1. 
142. [d. at art. 2, para. 3. 
143. [d. at art. 33, para.!. 
144. [d. at art. 24, para. 1. 
145. See 12 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 134, at 44-45. A pre-emptive nuclear first 
strike is one instance of where the principle of present danger is employed. 
146. [d. 
147. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 
275-79 (1963). Compare 12 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 134, at 52-55. For a discussion of 
this issue in connection with the Cuban missile crisis, see Meeker, Defensive Quarantine 
and the Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 515 (1963); Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 546 (1963); MacChesney, Some Comments on the "Quarantine" of Cuba, 57 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 592 (1963). See also Badr, supra note 138, at 11, where the author noted that 
"an axiom of legal interpretation [is] that where a general prohibitive norm is estab-
lished, any permissive exceptions to it must be provided for explicitly." 
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there can only be self-defense "against the illegal use of force, 
not against other violations of the law."148 Members of the 
United Nations International Law Commission have often 
stated unequivocally that under the Charter, self-defense is per-
mitted only against armed attack and that no reserved right of 
self-defense exists under customary international law.149 
In summary, in order for a State successfully to invoke self-
defense under article 51 of the United Nations Charter, two ele-
ments must exist: a prior armed attack against the State and an 
immediate, proportionate response by that State. Reconsidering 
the prior discussion of pre-emptive first strike and massive retal-
iation, it would appear that nuclear deterrence theory is incon-
sistent with the Charter's proscription on the use of force and 
self-defense. Minimally, nuclear deterrence theorists fail to men-
tion these considerations in their writings, thus indicating a 
blind spot regarding articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter.ll5o More-
over, by its very nature, nuclear deterrence is the threat of the 
use of force; thus, deterrence theory runs afoul of the proscrip-
tion in article 2(4).1151 
Although nuclear deterrence theory has evolved in its de-
claratory manifestations from mutual assured destruction to 
counterforce and flexible response, thereby reflecting a move-
ment toward a more lawful policy vis-a.-vis the United Nations 
Charter, as Keeny, Jr. and Panofsky have observed,1152 we live in 
an inherently MAD world. Escalation to total" nuclear war is in-
evitable once the first nuclear weapons are used, throwing into 
serious doubt whether proportionality is meaningful in the con-
text of nuclear deterrence theory. The intrinsic fragility of com-
munication systems and the entire C3I network makes the exe-
cution of a controlled, limited nuclear war a technological 
148. Kelsen, Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter of 
the United Nations, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 783-84 (1948). 
149. Summary Records of the 14th Meeting, [1949] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 108, 
U.N. Docs. A/CN. 4/2, A/CN. 4/2/Add. 1/1949; Summary Records of the 20th Meeting, 
[1949], 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 146-47, U.N. Docs. A/CN. 4, A/CN. 412/Add. 1/1949; 
Summary Records of the 95th Meeting, [1951] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 115, U.N. Doc. A/ 
CN. 4/SER.A/1951. 
150. One perhaps coincidental parallel between nuclear deterrence theory and the 
international law of self-defense is the concept of proportionality. The flexible response 
doctrine in part postulates the use of nuclear attacks in terms of proportionate responses 
to the nuclear attacks of the Soviet Union. 
151. The perennial nuclear posturing of United States leadership is arguably con-
trary to the prohibition in article 2(4) as well. 
152. See supra text accompanying notes 71-77. 
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nullity. As a result of this technological impediment, as well as 
the other factors which make it inherently difficult to initiate 
and maintain a limited nuclear war, mutual assured destruction 
is our ultimate nuclear deterrence policy. MAD not only lacks 
proportionality, but it also smacks of reprisal, which is prohib-
ited by the United Nations Charter. 
Finally, the refusal of the United States to renounce the 
first use of nuclear weapons is also contrary to the requirement 
of proportionality.lliS This is especially so in a situation where 
nuclear weapons are threatened in response to an outbreak of 
conventional hostilities in Western Europe, as is presently con-
templated by American defense strategists.lIi4 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this writer's view, there has been an inordinate reliance 
on nuclear deterrence theory as a source of national security. 
Deterrence theory needs to be put in proper perspective. For too 
long it has been a case of the tail wagging the dog. A better fo-
cus-and one that would provide greater security to both super-
powers-ought to be on a world order premised on confidence-
building among nations, where resort to force or threat of force 
is abjured. The establishment of mutual confidence between the 
superpowers is an essential prerequisite for arms control and 
disarmament. 
Altruism need not be the motivating force for such a focus 
either. Rather, national self-interest demands it. In the words of 
Stanley Hoffman, "It is in our interest to see to it that the bal-
ances of might and influence and the bonds of solidarity that 
world order requires be preserved and strengthened. . . . We 
are, as the globalists tell us, all in the same boat. "llili 
What is the role of international law in this connection? As 
has been previously observed, no nation may lawfully threaten 
the use of force against another nation. At the same time, how-
ever, no supra-authority exists which is empowered to enact and 
enforce effective rules of international conduct, let alone to arbi-
153. As Badr has written, supra note 138, at 23: "When it comes to the confronta-
tion between nuclear powers ... second-strike capability has been effective ••• in de-
terring a first nuclear strike. In this context, in particular, the incalculable risks involved 
in the erroneous notion of anticipatory self-defense boggle the imagination." 
154. See Bundy, Kennan, McNamara & Smith, Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic 
Alliance, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 753 (1982). 
155. S. HOFFMAN, PRIMACY OR WORLD ORDER 321 (1978). 
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trate state differences. Although a weak and vague proscription 
in article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits the threat 
or use of force, putting some muscle on this bare-boned article 
has been neither easy nor uncontroversial. The absence of a 
supra-authority has surely complicated matters. Regrettably, a 
universally embraced legal code has not attained ascendency in 
international law. 
Unlike the situation typically found in domestic law, the pa-
rameters of proscribed conduct are not nearly as well defined in 
the nuclear deterrence and international context. There are no 
express rules of behavior and no universally accepted code of 
impermissible international conduct applicable to the threat of 
or use of force. Not only is such conduct only vaguely proscribed 
in article 2(4), but the precise nature of the punishment to be 
imposed is not as certain as it is in the domestic context. The 
legal axiom, "Nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena since 
lege,"l1l6 has no analogue in the international context. 
This marked lack of clarity in both proscription of conduct 
and the range of punishment characterizing international aggres-
sion in general, and nuclear deterrence specifically, reflects the 
absence of a universally recognized legislative body empowered 
to declare certain conduct to be unlawful and to prescribe sanc-
tions. Today the rules of international conduct between nations 
are broad, vague and at times merely hortatory. There are few, if 
any, bright lines, short of a massive nuclear first strike, to signal 
when the nuclear threshold has been or is likely to be crossed. 
The absence of sharp lines and the resulting ambiguity could all 
too easily produce an unintended nuclear exchange.1117 
While the author is critical of the international system of 
world order because of its inability to check aggression effec-
tively, much, if not most, of the blame for this weakness must be 
laid at the feet of the nuclear powers. As publicists 
Schwarzenberger and Brown have perceptively noted: 
156. "No crime or punishment without a law so providing." Translation by the 
author. 
157. For example, how would the United States respond if the Soviet Union invaded 
Western Europe using only conventional weapons or a combination of conventional and 
tactical nuclear weapons? Or what if the Soviet Union invaded the Persian Gulf, seizing 
its oil fields? Can the Soviet Union do any better than hazard a guess as to possible 
United States responses in each instance? This ambiguity may nevertheless perform a 
preventive function by forcing the Soviet Union to guess, which would have an inhibitory 
effect. 
HeinOnline -- 9 Brook. J. Int’l L. 64 1983
64 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. [Vol. IX:1 
The possession of hydrogen bombs and delivery systems with 
global reach enable a few Powers to indulge in megaton diplo-
macy . . . The implications of the possession of the super-
. weapons of our age for international law and organisation are 
far-reaching. . . . As distinct from formal equality between 
sovereign States, nations which are able to manufacture such 
super-weapons or are relatively immune from their application 
are alone sovereign in the political sense.lGS 
The foregoing discussion has shown that international law is 
highly relevant in the context of nuclear deterrence. If taken 
into consideration, in fact, international law could have a signifi-
cant impact on the formulation of the postulates of nuclear de-
terrence theory. Regrettably, however, the role of international 
law in shaping nuclear deterrence theory is virtually nonexistent. 
Nuclear deterrence theory, through its failure to take the rule of 
law in international dealings into account, assumes ascendency 
over the law, rather than subservience to it. Thus, the rule of 
law makes no contribution to the formulation of nuclear deter-
rence theory. It is not at all clear, however, that the rule of law 
does not contribute, at least to some extent, to the maintenance 
of world order. 
The preceding discussion has also attempted to demonstrate 
that deterrence theory is a shaky foundation upon which to 
build a secure world order. It has further attempted to show 
that deterrence theory, standing alone, cannot explain why the 
world has not been ended by a nuclear holocaust. However, if 
this state of affairs is not attributable to deterrence, what does 
in fact prevent the superpowers from entering into overt hostili-
ties with each other? One answer may center on the perceived 
legitimacy of the present world order. An example drawn from 
the domestic arena may be illuminating. It should be obvious 
that if every taxpayer stopped paying taxes, there is little the 
Internal Revenue Service could do about it. Nevertheless, we 
continue to pay our taxes dutifully each April 15. Why? One an-
swer may be that we recognize, first, the government's legitimate 
interest in collecting taxes and, second, that chaos would other-
wise be visited upon our society. Apropos in this context is the 
following statement by James Brierly in his work The Law of 
Nations: 
The ultimate explanation of the binding force of all law is that 
158. G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, supra note 100, at 309-10. 
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man, whether he is a single individual or whether he is associ-
ated with other men in a state, is constrained, in so far as he is 
a reasonable being, to believe that order and not chaos is the 
governing principle of the world in which he has to live.1G9 
65 
The superpowers may have kept their figurative fingers off 
the nuclear button so far because they tacitly recognize the legit-
imacy of the present world order that resulted from the Yalta 
Conference in 1945.160 Whether the rule of law has made any 
contribution to this state of affairs, however, is another question. 
Given the inordinate reliance on deterrence theory as a 
source of national security, this writer has argued that ulti-
mately, the more appropriate focus should be on the perceived 
legitimacy of the world order and how those perceptions can be 
engendered, strengthened and maintained.16l Preservation of the 
status quo seems hardly attributable solely to nuclear threats. 
The issue of legitimacy deserves greater research and emphasis. 
In this connection, some useful insights can be gleaned from 
criminal deterrence theory, especially the latter's lessons regard-
ing the inhibitory and habituating effects of the criminal law. 
One such lesson immediately suggests itself: a society tends to 
be law-abiding because it recognizes the legitimacy of the ex-
isting social order and the benefits that can be obtained from 
that order, rather than because of fear of apprehension and pun-
ishment for transgressions of the criminal law. 
While the foregoing points to at least one long-term strategy 
for increased world security, in the short term, other more im-
mediate steps should be explored as alternatives and supple-
ments to nuclear deterrence. One area which could be particu-
larly fruitful is the psychological dimension of deterrence 
theory.162 For example, an exchange of "peace hostages," i.e., 80-
159. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 56 (6th ed. 1963). 
160. See Steel, Poland and the Ghost of Yalta, The New Republic, Jan. 27, 1982, at 
13-15. For a criticism of Steel's views in that article, see Wieseltier, Liberals Against 
Liberty, The New Republic, Feb. 10, 1982, at 18-20. It has been suggested that a new 
East-West order has overtaken Yalta as a consequence of the Helsinki accords. 
161. Hedley Bull has written that nations interested in arms controls and disarma-
ment ought to direct their energies to international rather than national security as the 
starting point for arms control. H. BULL, THE CONTROL OF THE ARMS RACE (2d ed. 1965). 
As noted in the REPORT OF THE SECRETARy-GENERAL, supra note 6, at 147, "It is almost 
axiomatic that the level of international security is adversely affected when a superpower 
becomes uncertain about its own security." 
162. Query whether the thirty-five year old nuclear regime has engendered an un-
conscious inhibition against crossing the nuclear threshold? Is the effectiveness of nu-
clear deterrence attributable in part to unconscious and emotional fears and aspirations, 
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viet and American nationals with whom the political and mili-
tary leaders of the two superpowers have strong emotional ties, 
merits examination.16s Clearly, erecting higher psychological bar-
riers against the thought of a nuclear first strike in the minds of 
American and Soviet leaders is an important starting point to-
ward enhanced national security for both nations. Social-psycho-
logical deterrence, rather than nuclear deterrence, should thus 
be more closely considered. 
Can nuclear deterrence be characterized as effective? Nu-
clear deterrence theorists defend the utility of their theory by 
pointing out that a nuclear exchange has not occurred over the 
past thirty-seven years.164 Deductively, however, deterrence the-
ory can neither be verified nor disproved. But even though de-
terrence theory has not been disproven, as the foregoing discus-
sion has attempted to show, much doubt has been cast on its 
continued viability. It has been said that "[n]uclear strategy has 
reached a dead end."l65 Nuclear deterrence theory contains no 
provision for its own resolution short of continued escalation, a 
pre-emptive first strike, or accidental war. Nor does it tell us 
where to proceed once the ideal state of mutual deterrence has 
been attained. It is time to abandon nuclear deterrence theory in 
favor of a more secure basis for building national and, ulti-
mately, world security. 
as seems to be the case in criminal deterrence? Although any conclusion on this point is 
extremely speculative, some observers agree that the specter of a nuclear holocaust has 
prevented the two superpowers from squaring off and colliding militarily. See Keeny & 
Panofsky, supra note 7, at 288. 
163. Such an exchange could take the form of sending the children, grandchildren 
and other close relatives of the Soviet and American power elite (including, ideally, the 
children, grandchildren and close relatives of the President of the United States and the 
Premier of the Soviet Union) to the other's capital and major cities for educational and 
cultural purposes. With such an exchange in place, the leaders of the superpowers would 
know that they would be directly killing members of their own families if they initiated a 
nuclear first strike. 
164. Some would argue that this happy state of affairs is nothing more than a fortu-
ity, in that the risks of nuclear war are essentially independent of any deterrence doc-
trine. See Keeny & Panofsky, supra note 7, at 287-88. 
165. Freedman, supra note 40, at 67. 
